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Abstract—The systematic integration of the Internet of 
Things (IoT) and Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) into the supply 
chain to increase operational efficiency and quality has also 
introduced new complexities to the threat landscape. The 
myriad of sensors could increase data collection capabilities for 
businesses to facilitate process automation aided by Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) but without adopting an appropriate Security-
by-Design framework, threat detection and response are 
destined to fail. The emerging concept of Smart Workplace 
incorporates many CPS (e.g. Robots and Drones) to execute 
tasks alongside Employees both of which can be exploited as 
Insider Threats. We introduce and discuss forensic-readiness, 
liability attribution and the ability to track moving Smart SPS 
Objects to support modern Digital Forensics and Incident 
Response (DFIR) within a defence-in-depth strategy. We 
present a framework to facilitate the tracking of object 
behaviour within Smart Controlled Business Environments 
(SCBE) to support resilience by enabling proactive insider 
threat detection. Several components of the framework were 
piloted in a company to discuss a real-life case study and 
demonstrate anomaly detection and the emerging of 
behavioural patterns according to objects’ movement with 
relation to their job role, workspace position and nearest entry 
or exit. The empirical data was collected from a Bluetooth-based 
Proximity Monitoring Solution. Furthermore, a key strength of 
the framework is a federated Blockchain (BC) model to achieve 
forensic-readiness by establishing a digital Chain-of-Custody 
(CoC) and a collaborative environment for CPS to qualify as 
Digital Witnesses (DW) to support post-incident investigations. 
Keywords— Insider threat, Anomaly Detection, Digital 
Witness, IoT, Smart building, Smart City, Monitoring, 
Authenticity, Non-repudiation 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of digitalization has a massive impact on 
businesses and the wider society. Within the current trend of 
automation and data exchange forming the concept of 
Industry 4.0 [1], the manufacturing industry has paved way 
for a systematic integration of Internet of Things (IoT) and 
Cyber-Physical Systems’ (CPS) to develop and support 
products, converging physical entities, digital technology as 
well as creating a sphere of inclusivity in the workplace. 
However, as Smart Cities grow and progressively digitalise, 
numerous challenges must be addressed to remain 
competitive, innovative, sustainable and more efficient in 
ways the Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) is managed 
and controlled. 
 
Smart Buildings, a core component of Smart Cities, are 
considered a complex growing network of fragile [2] Cyber-
Physical-Natural (CPN) ecosystem incorporating human-
users and a variety of connected SPS Objects. Similar to the 
wider IoT landscape, Smart Buildings are governed by a 
fragmentation of standards [3] due to the fast evolvement of 
the technology. However, companies continue to adopt and 
adapt to new business models to capitalize on the 
opportunities provided by such disruptive technologies. IoT 
and CPS help to gather information in real-time to maintain a 
global visibility and trackability of the supply chain [4]. 
Intelligence gathering in buildings is achieved by establishing 
connectivity between the different services using CPS that 
can be managed automatically and controlled remotely over 
the network. However, these advances come with numerous 
risks and pose significant challenges [4]. Often, legacy 
technology is combined with innovative IoT products to 
achieve a competitive edge. For example, the components 
and sensors for the conventional Physical Building Access 
Control (PBAC), Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning 
(HVAC), Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) or Building 
Monitoring Systems (BMS) were strictly controlled through 
specific vendor channels but the advancement of IoT 
commoditized many of these components resulting in 
cheaper but uncontrolled route to the market. Manufacturers 
producing smart devices frequently apply their own 
proprietary standards leading to heterogenous 
overcomplicated systems making interoperability extremely 
challenging [5]. The conventional buildings’ automation, 
control components and systems were constructed to an 
internal only design. The increased interconnectivity and the 
heterogeneity of the current landscape in Smart Buildings 
have inherent cybersecurity risks [6] resulting in a large threat 
surface with potentially serious impacts and consequences in 
the event of a security breach, not only in critical buildings 
but also in strictly regulated sectors such as finance. It is 
estimated that in 2018 as much as 20% of Smart Buildings 
are subject to digital vandalism [7]. 
 
The human factor, an important dimension in the CPN 
ecosystem, is an inherent weakness that is usually overlooked 
and underestimated [8, 9]. Therefore, it is exploited by most 
intruders to gain access to computer systems. As such, 
Phishing attacks continue to grow as one of the most common 
and serious threats in the cyberspace with evidence of recent 
Phishing scams targeting the emerging domain of IoT [10]. 
The threat from human insiders in the workplace is real [11] 
as organisations face severe security challenges including but 
not limited to unauthorised access, fraud and industrial 
espionage. In a Smart Workplace, the risk associated with 
insiders extends the threat model beyond the human factor to 
include “Smart Insiders” [11]. The control of Smart Insiders 
or CPS Objects becomes more complex with the increased 
number of CPS devices and connected services; IoT are 
forecasted to be around 30 Billion [12] and that by 2018 more 
than 3 million workers will be supervised by robots [7]. 
 
This paper addresses the potential problem of 
identification and object-tracking within Smart Controlled 
Business Environment (SCBE). We argue that anomaly 
detection related to the movement and location of insiders as 
a means of Security-by-Design requires digital forensics 
readiness to facilitate post-incident investigations. Therefore, 
our framework incorporates BC technology. A significant 
amount of research is available pertaining to video and 
network surveillance, however, to the best of our knowledge 
there is little research covering internal threat detection 
within SCBE and the significance of collecting, identifying 
and revealing data without compromising it within the realm 
of digital forensics. Further research is needed into this 
growing research area to streamline concepts and develop 
Security-by-Design frameworks. Further to acknowledging 
the complexity and challenges introduced by IoT (including 
CPS Objects) inside the workplace, the motivation for this 
paper arises from the opportunities presented. For instance, 
we argue that CPS Objects can be modelled as “Digital 
Witnesses” (DW) to support DFIR; logs generated by CPS 
Objects can help in the process of event reconstruction, while 
the integrity, and therefore admissibility of this data, can be 
achieved with a BC-based Chain-of-Custody (CoC). 
 
In the remainder of this paper, we discuss related work in 
Section II, present our tracking and liability attribution 
framework in Section III. Section IV shares a case study of 
internal threats detection in the workplace based on object 
movement. Finally, we conclude our study in Section V. 
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
A. Inherent and Emerging Threats facing CPS in the Work 
Place and beyond 
While Smart Devices comprise the backbone of CPS 
structures, CPS forms the basis of Smart Workplaces scaled 
up to Smart Buildings and Smart Cities with their sensing, 
processing, and communication capabilities. The requirement 
for a robust CPS deployment requires threat modelling of the 
several security challenges many of which are surveyed and 
reported in recent studies [13-15]. The Smart Workplace is 
an indispensable component of a Smart City infrastructure. 
Smart Workplaces deploy controlling and scheduling tasks to 
facilitate the management of the supply chain.   
 
CPS attracts compromised-key attacks because many 
sensor nodes utilise cryptographic keys to participate in 
handshake protocols which include authenticity checks [13]. 
Likewise, the data storage within CPS is targeted aiming to 
break the confidentiality or integrity of the stored data. Other 
targeted components include but are not limited to 
communication channels, actuation control and end points 
[16]. The prevention, detection and mitigation of attacks 
against CPS are still emerging [17] while attack strategies are 
transformed from older implementations such as Man-in-
The-Middle (MiTM), Spoofing, Denial-of-Service (DoS) and 
Eavesdropping. Hence, the exploitation of security 
vulnerabilities in Smart Devices continue with a long list that 
includes security cameras, smart TVs, smart door locks, 
power outlets, and even smart toilets within buildings [15]. 
   
Although integrated security systems are transformational 
to Smart Buildings, myriad of sensors are used to increase 
automation without appropriate security testing in favour of 
ease of use [18]. For example, in 2016 guests in an Austrian 
hotel were locked out of their room subject to a ransom 
payment [19] whilst in Finland, a DDoS targeted the heating 
system [20]. A taxonomy of security threats in Smart Devices 
can be listed as Boot Process Vulnerabilities, Hardware 
Exploitation, Chip-Level Exploitation, Encryption and Hash 
Function Implementations, Backdoors in Remote Access 
Channels, and finally Software Exploitation [15]. 
B. Behavioural Attribution and Tracking 
Despite the transition from traditional to an IoT-enabled 
workplace, research suggests that threat detection strategies 
are limited to the organisational boundary. There is little 
evidence of cross-organisational information security 
sharing, structure and coordination [21]. Practices are in silos 
with centralised control management [22] lacking cyber-
defence collaboration or clear strategy to deal with the insider 
threat. To address the increasingly more sophisticated, 
coordinated and targeted cyber-attacks including Advanced 
Persistent Threats (APTs) [23], innovative solutions are 
required to support a modern defence-in-depth strategy. 
   
That said, the data collected through IoT connected CPS 
provides an unprecedented wealth of information which can 
be used to profile behaviour attributes and track movement of 
human insiders and CPS Objects within SCBE. For example, 
IoT-connected motion detectors were used to identify the 
number of occupants in a living space [23] and in Campus’ 
Sports Facilities [24]. Recent research in connected cars 
demonstrates that data generated from in-car sensors yield 
outcomes about drivers’ behaviours and patterns of 
movement [24, 25]. Research suggests that transferable 
solutions should emerge from individual sectors within smart 
environment [26], for instance, analysing information from 
proximity sensors in combination with other information 
such as Global Positioning System (GPS) data aided by AI 
could detect anomalies [40]  more proactively and faster. 
 
To achieve forensic readiness and to support modern 
DFIR it is necessary to establish and maintain the privacy and 
integrity of evidence. BC technology was recently proposed 
for the area of liability attribution in autonomous vehicles 
[27] and forensic analysis in road traffic accidents [28]. In 
behavioural attribution and tracking in Smart Workplaces, it 
is particularly important to protect the privacy and integrity 
of data. In the case of a private network, permissioned BC is 
more suitable because access to data is restricted to relevant 
stakeholders. Furthermore, a hybrid implementation of a 
permissioned BC facilitates federation for a shared 
collaborative approach for cyber resilience. 
C. Regulatory Landscape 
The regulatory landscape is very diverse and dynamic 
aiming at establishing an international baseline approach for 
DFIR. For instance, the ISO/IEC 27037 covers the initial 
acquisition of digital evidence, ISO/IEC 27041 ensures the 
appropriate methods are utilised for the digital forensics 
process, ISO/IEC 27042 focuses on the analysis and 
interpretation phases, and ISO/IEC 27043 covers earlier pre-
incident preparations but also advising on other aspects such 
as evidence storage. Additionally, the IT security catalogue 
from ISO contains multi-part standards focusing on 
electronic discovery (eDiscovery) namely the ISO/IEC 
27050-1:2016, ISO/IEC 27050-3:2017, and ISO/IEC 27050-
2:2018. They are concerned with the location and 
preservation of pertinent Electronically Stored Information 
(ESI) including data by any stakeholder involved in the 
investigation. In the European Union, there is no common 
approach to IoT security. However, there are initiatives to 
publish baseline cybersecurity recommendations [3]. 
Moreover, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
enforces data protection by design.  
 
Beyond IoT technical security challenges, many new 
legal and regulatory concerns are yet to be addressed. A study 
focusing on Australian perspectives discussed the impact of 
IoT-based ubiquitous surveillance on the basic structure of 
society [29] concluded that more efforts to reform a 
responsive regulation are required. In the United State (US), 
the Department for Homeland Security and Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) have already promoted guidelines and 
best practices for IoT security based on frameworks and 
standards by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) but they are non-binding. Recently, the 
“Internet of Things Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2017” 
was recently introduced to establish the minimum set of 
requirements for IoT implementations [3]. 
III. BLOCKCHAIN-BASED TRACKING AND LIABILITY 
ATTRIBUTION FRAMEWORK (BTLA-FRAMEWORK)  
To address the research question of this study which can 
be expressed as: How can we facilitate a DFIR-enabled 
automated process for proactive threat detection related to 
Smart Insiders (Employees and CPS Objects) in the 
workplace? 
 
We integrate BC technology to achieve Forensic-enabled 
proactive insider threat detection. Furthermore, we apply 
Bluetooth technology to a Proximity Monitoring model to 
demonstrate behaviour patterns of employees in the 
workspace. We utilize empirical data collected from a 
Bluetooth-based Proximity Monitoring Solution 
implemented in a real company.  
A. Threat Model 
To appreciate the value of proactive insider threat 
detection, consideration should be given to challenges in 
existing Smart Workplaces. For example, technology misuse 
related to hacking digital gateways could lead to unauthorised 
access to SCBE. Another complex yet underestimated area is 
“social challenges”. We suppose a situation where sabotage 
by a disgruntled employee or unmonitored access by an 
external contractor, who have authorized access and an in-
depth knowledge of the environment could lead to disruption 
of critical equipment or services. Likewise, in this situation, 
an easy access to computers could result in an event where a 
computer is used to commit a crime, or where unauthorized 
data manipulation is carried out resulting in financial or 
reputational damage to the business. Access to a floor or part 
of a building may not be unusual but could reflect anomalous 
behaviour when linked and considered collectively over a 
period of time. Developments in CPS provide opportunities 
to proactively mitigate these threats, relying on object 
profiling and pattern analysis to identify anomalies. 
Likewise, establishing an online CoC for auditing and 
forensic purposes.  
B. Framework Principles 
The integration of CPS proliferates the opportunities for 
digital forensic analysis, enabling it to take advantage of the 
huge amounts of data being collected. The ability to collect 
data from CPS Objects and understand their behaviour can 
support DFIR, for instance in cases of investigating 
unauthorized access. Partially collected data is insufficient as 
it does not always cover the object’s history in full. Trust and 
integrity of data could be questionable or its integration from 
various stakeholders. The ultimate goal for the BTLA-
framework is to improve cyber defence and provide a way to 
ensure that the generated data is verifiable as a credible 
evidence for the digital forensics’ realm. 
 
Traditionally, the Confidentiality, Integrity and 
Availability (CIA) model was considered the core of good 
security practice. Recent research proposes the Parkerian 
Hexad [26, 30] as a basis for a forward-looking approach to 
retain the effectiveness of CPS cybersecurity in smart cities. 
Other approaches were considered [28, 31] and we argue that 
[26] provides more robust and comprehensive principles for 
the complex and fragmented CPN ecosystem than the 
conventional CIA. Hence, our framework’s key principles are 
defined as: 
Confidentiality. All access must be compliant with current 
legislation and regulation, preventing unauthorized access. 
Integrity. Data must be protected from unauthorized change. 
Availability. Data must be highly available, from multiple 
sources of trust and each trusted source must be assured. 
Authenticity. Verification of data source and change is 
critical throughout its lifecycle. 
Possession. Prevent unauthorized manipulation of data 
Utility. Maintain the data throughout its lifecycle. For digital 
forensics, it is critical to have access to comprehensive 
current and historical data. For example, the emergence of 
behavioural patterns or movement patterns is manifested over 
time. 
Safety. A seventh dimension proposed by [26] asserts that the 
generation and use of data should not be harmful.  This is a 
particularly relevant area considering the complexity and 
immaturity of CPN ecosystems with people being a key facet. 
In addition, the framework should be computationally 
efficient and agile. 
C. Blockchain Technology Integration 
To help support the proactive [17] insider threat detection 
with a verifiable audit trail to facilitate DFIR, the value of BC 
technology should be exploited. Initially implemented for the 
Bitcoin cryptocurrency, BC technology is composed of 
cryptographically-linked append-only blocks forming a 
trusted, shared and distributed ledger of transactions. It fulfils 
the purpose of decentralization of trusted sources, 
authenticity, integrity and responsibility. Different types of 
BC were initially considered. Public, permissionless BC 
structure, like Bitcoin or Ethereum, is not controlled by 
anyone but inspectable by everyone whereas private 
permissioned BC structure requires permissions-based 
membership. In a BC, all participating nodes retain the full 
BC copy, which comprises chronologically arranged blocks 
containing the hash of the previous block in the chain. As the 
transactions are received, new blocks are created and 
accepted by members’ consensus. Public BC consensus is 
based on Proof-of-Work (PoW), while it can withstand up to 
50% compromised nodes, the implementation of the 
consensus protocol results in fewer transactions per second. 
The key criticism, therefore, is the computational complexity 
of the model. An alternative form of consensus, Proof-of-
Authority (PoA) is based on pre-authorized validators, 
typically suited for a permissioned network where all 
validators are known. The computational algorithm of the 
private BC, Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance or Stellar 
Consensus is less demanding with a higher throughput but 
requires a higher number of nodes to remain trustworthy.  
Leveraging the features of a permissioned BC, we propose 
that, for threat detection, all objects must be registered based 
on the predefined process and criteria for access control. 
Permissioned (private or federated) BC will provide speed, 
manageability, privacy, tracking without delay, trust and 
integrity amongst a group of Smart Workplaces with a 
commitment to a common framework.  
D. Framework Participants  
We define typical participants (Fig. 1) and their 
interactions (Fig. 2) to guide the design of the proposed 
framework: 
Objects (Employees or CPS Objects). We define 
employees as persons with an authorized contractual 
association to the Smart Workplace, like employees, workers, 
supply chain contractors. CPS Objects are smart physical or 
virtual objects capable of performing tasks. Objects are 
assumed to have the ability to provide the primary evidence 
for digital forensics, to have a tamper-proof storage for the 
data it stores, and logs metadata such as Object Identifier, and 
Date/Time Stamps, Authorized Zones and Schedules.  
Manufacturers. They periodically receive CPS patch status 
information and provide updates logging the current and 
applied patch status. 
Witnesses. We refer to Digital Witness (DW or W) [32] as 
CPS Objects which are functionally capable to maintain an 
admissible evidence to a Court-of-Law similar to human 
witnesses. They receive, store data and have the ability to 
transfer their perceived knowledge (evidence) according to a 
predefined set of rules. 
Security Authority. internal physical or virtual entities who 
analyse anomalies and breaches. They act as a gatekeeper and 
a hand-off point coordinators when digital evidence is 
requested by the legal authority.  
Legal Authority. includes law enforcement agencies, Police 
and Courts of Law. They receive digital evidence as part of 
an investigation process.  As breach resolution authorities, the 
Security Authority and the Legal Authority has separate roles 
in the framework to enforce data governance within a legal 
context as a measure to prevent data abuse. This maintains 
the principles of the framework e.g. Object ID is only 
revealed when these two entities cooperate  
 
 
Fig. 1Tracking and Liability Attribution Framework Participants 
 
Fig. 2 Tracking and Liability Attribution Framework Interactions between  
 
E. Framework Deployment 
The framework requires a daemon component, it can be 
a physical or a virtual appliance, an application or a network 
daemon that communicates with the objects to collect data in 
(near) real-time. The daemon has read access to receive the 
data streams. There are three types of data; information data 
related to object movement through the security zones, event 
data triggered by an exception based on pre-defined 
parameters and device status data. 
 
As part of the core infrastructure, the power and 
sensitivity of each sensor and beacon are controlled through 
the communication server allowing authorized manipulation 
of the monitoring capabilities according to requirements. The 
objects’ storage capability is either local or referenced 
collectively to a Cloud-based Evidence Storage facility that 
is robust and highly available. It is assumed that modern core 
infrastructure complies with the ISO/IEC 27001 Information 
Security and ISO/IEC 22301 Business Continuity standards. 
There are several roles within the realm of a smart workplace. 
Objects (proposers) offer transactions processed by validator 
nodes. The verification process is enabled by hashes 
submitted to the BC. The proposer (a lightweight node) is the 
entity that stores the data (potential evidence). The validator 
is an authorized node forming the Consortium of Validators 
defined by their ability to store data and validate the 
transaction.  
 
The framework structure is based on a permissioned BC 
(private or federated) with Smart Contracts proposed to 
control the transfer of ownership at an authorized handover 
point to the legal authority. Physically or virtually connected 
objects are capable of transmitting data within the smart 
workplace. Therefore, each device could be utilised either as 
a DW or a Hearsay DW. To describe the data lifecycle within 
our framework, we consider a single digital evidence and 
move it through the data lifecycle phases following the 
Digital Witness processes in ISO/IEC 27050:2016. 
 
With the assumption that a digital investigation is taking 
place, all related data is potential digital evidence. An 
authorized entity that initially holds the ownership 
periodically transmits this data due to the limited local 
storage attached to CPS Objects but also for better data 
confidentiality and availability. The daemon within the BC 
consortium (validator node) continuously polls the beacons 
over a peer-to-peer network arrangement. Identities are 
cryptographically validated using public-private key pairs for 
each transaction, which then must be validated using an 
appropriate pre-defined byzantine agreement algorithm to 
reach a consensus of a valid transaction. Each block in the 
chain contains the hash, random nonce and root hash, 
timestamp and metadata of all transactions permanently 
recorded with the ability to trace back to the first (Genesis) 
block. DW logs the data in the BC while the actual 
records/logs (Digital Evidence) can be stored across a range 
of authorized storage nodes, forming a ‘Hearsay’ cluster of 
nodes referenced in a CoC based on the BC’s metadata as 
demonstrated in Fig. 3. 
 
 
Fig. 3 Proposed Blockchain process for tracking and liability attribution 
Any interaction with the records (Digital Evidence) is subject 
to approvals by the Consortium of Validators within the 
permissioned BC. If a request is made to pull evidence, the 
current owner issues a request for ownership transfer. This 
request can only be initiated by the Security Authority 
designated node. Upon evidence request, the requester takes 
on the role of the proposer, and the validators verify the 
request. Transfer record is then written in the Evidence Log 
and the metadata on the BC is updated. Evidence Log and the 
Smart Contract is used when the transfer of ownership is 
required on evidence request (Fig. 4). The Processing, 
Review and Analyses of digital evidence maintain the BC 
process (Fig. 5). 
 
 
Fig. 4 Proposed Blockchain process to transfer the ownership of digital 
evidence 
 
Fig. 5 Proposed Bluetooth Proximity Monitoring Model 
The behaviour characteristics model. Bluetooth-based 
Proximity Monitoring model is an integral part of the 
framework to identify human-users and CPS Objects based 
on their behavioural attributes to maintain their visibility and 
traceability. Activities are registered when objects move 
through predefined security zones. Data streams are 
harvested in (near) real time from Bluetooth enabled devices. 
That said, to enhance the model’s resilience against possible 
intruders, connection disruption or signal jamming it could be 
strengthened and combined with supplementary technology 
like GPS that could be considered a key factor to enhance a 
proactive approach of predictive monitoring. The dataset is 
enriched by combining it with data identified during 
registration thus allowing for a wider range of typical 
characteristics to be captured (Fig. 6). It is then processed and 
stored securely as it must be protected from cyber-attacks.   
 
 
Fig. 6 Proposed Bluetooth Proximity Monitoring Model 
 
The research question in this paper covered automation 
and proactive threat detection to minimize the window-size 
between insider attacks and the time required to detect and 
verify the malicious event. Furthermore, to investigate the 
correlation within the cluster and the object’s own 
behavioural pattern in time-series. Therefore, an embedded 
algorithm is constructed to provide accurate results against a 
comparative baseline with triggers for unusual or abnormal 
behavioural patterns. This proactive identification could lead 
to a timely mitigation of insider threat.  
IV. CASE STUDY: DAKOTA 
A. Dakota’s Threat Landscape  
Dakota (a fictional name) is a medium-sized organization 
that occupies 5 floors in a typical open plan modern shared 
workspace leased from a corporate landlord, who employs a 
Management Agency (MA) to look after facilities and 
maintenance. Dakota, regulated by the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) in the UK must pre-screen all their 
employees, but this cannot be assured for the numerous 
external contractors employed by the MA that Dakota has to 
rely on and share with the other organizations within the 
building. Security reception staff, forming the first layer of 
security defence, are employed by MA. External contractors 
are subject to a registration process before entering Dakota’s 
own reception but are not issued with an access control pass 
unless access is required to floors other than Dakota’s. Insider 
threat [33-35] by external contractors requiring access 
potentially unsupervised and outside of normal operational 
hours was identified by Dakota as a significant risk to the 
business.  
B. Piloting the BTLA-Framework for Anomaly Detection 
Several components of our tracking and liability 
attribution framework were piloted as a proof-of-concept for 
the Dakota case study to provide Forensic-enabled anomaly 
detection as briefed below: 
Environment. Various models were presented to mitigate 
the risk of access control and internal building movement that 
characterise types of internal threat which are often 
underestimated. Advances in GPS technology, Bluetooth, 
Wi-Fi, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) enabled 
indoor employee tracking but many are considered costly. 
Android-based indoor tracking solution using magnetic map 
matching was implemented by [36] whilst [37] tested the 
magnet-based tracking on a robot. These solutions are 
computationally inexpensive with several limitations as they 
require predefined walking routes. RFID was used by [38] as 
a method of tracking usage of Campus’ Sports Facilities. 
Interoperability, cost and coverage are key guiding principles 
for the proximity monitoring solution, which can be further 
enhanced by combining Bluetooth with other technologies 
such as RFID, Wi-Fi or GPS to increase and enhance the 
resilience. In this use case, the building access control is 
based on RFID technology [39], it is separate from Dakota’s 
own access control that uses Bluetooth Proximity Monitoring 
Solution, there is an agreement on technology standard to 
ensure that a single security pass can be programmed to use 
both access control systems. The proximity system forms an 
integral part of Dakota’s access control solution, combining 
a door entry system that incorporates elevator access and 
Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV). Furthermore, the 
prototype for this experimental study considered a 
consortium BC in which several companies can, by design, 
be able to practice control, it is, therefore, a permissioned and 
semi-decentralised system. 
 
Objects. In this case study, these are the individuals in a role 
(including external contractors) with a related set of 
parameters. Each role with its own set of parameters and in 
some cases multiple functions fulfilled by a single role. 
Examples of roles include but are not limited to cleaners, 
electricians, building maintenance, catering, waste disposal, 
cabling engineers, security, and external IT support staff. 
 
Procedure. The Bluetooth beacons and scanners with 
preloaded floor plans were strategically fitted in the building. 
Therefore, the individuals were registered and given a 
Bluetooth and RFID enabled ID badge. As the individuals 
entered and exited a controlled zone, the relevant beacon 
registered them. The data was received from the Bluetooth 
enabled ID badge by the beacon. The data was processed by 
a server and stored onto an embedded database. A trigger was 
configured to copy the data from local native data sets to a 
separate secondary database where it was reconstructed and 
stored into a new format as shown in Fig. 7. The data 
collection was an automated process. 
 
Collected Data. Data about business-critical operational 
areas zones, beacon deployment, individuals’ roles, and 
tracked movement were identified and collected for a period 
of 2 months. Firstly, the raw data was gathered with a limited 
feature set only allowing the individual’s position. Secondly, 
to start profiling movement over time the raw data was 
enhanced, reconstructed and stored on a Shadow Guard 
server logging attributes such as the Reconstructed ID, 
Date/Timestamp, UserID, Entry/Exit Flag, EnterID, Zone 
and Timing. No personal data was collected. 
 
 
Fig. 7: Data stream between the Bluetooth badge and the servers 
 
C. Data Analysis 
Behavioural patterns emerged with relation to 
individuals’ pattern of movement relevant to their job role, 
workspace position and nearest entry or exit. Analysis of the 
data demonstrates a clear behavioural pattern (Fig. 8) and 




Fig. 8: data collected over the two-month period shows, that the cleaners 
access the floor through the same entry point 90% of the time. 
 
 
Fig. 9: Anomalous Activity point-based anomaly chart detailing user activity 
We optimised the algorithm by reducing the effect of data 
noise [41], in Dakota’s case noise being defined as the zone 
bleedover, by setting the minimum time period to 10s within 
the security model. (Fig. 10) references the demarcation point 
as a percentage of normal operating activity that includes a 
margin of error based on the data observed over a 7-day 
period. Activity has been correlated into three bands - normal, 
unusual and abnormal activity. It is evident that the normal 
time spent within a specific zone (location: 3rd floor) by one 
job role accounts for 95.5% of all activity, representing 
normal activity. The data defines a much smaller grouping 
that can be identified as unusual behaviour (3.5%). The last 
recorded data point for this zone was between 7-8 minutes 
(1.5%) and this has been designated as abnormal. Data 
recorded beyond this demarcation point would be considered 
a potential threat and an alert generated. However, a single 
event may not be reflective of anomalous behaviour and 
could generate a false positive alert. Data captured over 2 
days (Fig. 10) shows how movement pattern differs on a daily 
basis whilst retaining the ability to detect anomalous 
behaviour within a complex pattern of movement. Our results 
were then validated against the RFID access control being the 
needed DW in this context, while the BC could facilitate the 
required integrity checks as part of the established digital 
CoC. 
 
Fig. 10: Data Capture over two days for the same employee showing 
movement pattern with an anomalous behaviour exception alert trigger. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Conventional access control systems secure physically 
separated areas but still rely on human intervention to prevent 
unauthorized access. However, they are insufficient to 
address emerging threats beyond the human factor in Smart 
Workplaces. For example, a security personnel will have to 
use a special toolkit to verify the identity of drones and 
robots. We argue that (near) real-time detection is required to 
replace conventional methods but still insufficient to deal 
with the inherent cybersecurity weakness in Smart 
Environments. Therefore, we proposed a framework that 
incorporates forensic-readiness for post-incident 
investigations utilising IoT and CPS Objects as DW [33]. 
 
We outlined and discussed the threat landscape, identified 
key principles to be maintained by the framework and 
prototyped the anomaly detection capability using a 
Bluetooth Proximity Monitoring Solution. We have also 
presented the Dakota case study in which several components 
from our framework were implemented. we acknowledge 
that further prototyping is required before all the models are 
standardised. For example, results collected by the Bluetooth-
based solution could be enhanced if combined with 
technologies such as GPS. 
 
While our case study was piloted in a traditional 
workplace, the BTLA-Framework, by design, covers the 
CPN ecosystem incorporating both humans (employees) and 
CPS Objects. The choice of technology to support DFIR by 
the framework and to identify and track behavioural patterns 
in time series were scrutinized. Several key facets were taken 
into consideration in constructing the framework, such as the 
Parkerian Hexad elements of information security [13], 
safety [14], computational efficiency, privacy and integrity of 
the digital evidence. For example, private permissioned BC 
technology does not permit unauthorised parties to manage 
digital evidence, therefore, one of the key advantages of this 
approach is to maintain a digital CoC without exposing any 
data to the public [42] aiming to preserve object’s privacy as 
part of the digital investigation process [43]. The strengths of 
the public BC include freedom, neutrality and openness, 
whereas any participant can volunteer to send or validate a 
transaction, we assert that private BCs are a better choice for 
Smart Workplaces since all the participants are known and 
permissions are restricted, therefore the support for privacy is 
greater. A hybrid, consortium-based BC approach is also 
possible in a modern shared workspace, as our case study 
suggests. The nodes are trusted and reliably connected at high 
speeds resulting in a computationally lightweight solution if 
compared to the significantly higher cost public BC.  
 
The case study played a critical role in demonstrating 
employee behavioural attributes in relation to the 
participants’ pattern of movement relevant to their job role.  
Point-based and time-series behavioural anomalies were 
revealed (Fig. 8 - Fig. 10). Data showed that during a set test 
period 95.5% of all captured activity was normal, with 3.5% 
being unusual and 1.5% abnormal, amounting to as little as 8 
minutes’ time segment. The data capture accurately detected 
such anomaly over a 2 and a 7 days reference period with the 
availability of historical data. The strength of our framework 
is in its ability to converge the physical and digital domain 
through exploiting the opportunities of human-users and 
connected CPS Objects.  
 
The concept of modelling CPS Objects as DW supports 
DFIR and secure integrity of data using BC technology helps 
to achieve BC-based Digital Chain-of-Custody (CoC). The 
framework’s architecture could be applied collaboratively 
across multiple domains to better realise the value of a 
federated BC-based technology and its impact on realising 
forensic-readiness at a larger scale (e.g. smart cities) [5]. The 
directions for future work in this area could focus on testing 
several models within the framework to provide further 
recommendations related to the usual trade-off between 
privacy and digital forensics, or between usability and the 
cybersecurity principles. 
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